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DOES SIZE MATTER? AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SMALL
BUSINESS EXEMPTIONS FROM REGULATION
by
C. Steven BradforJ
"In the ant's house the dew is a flood."
-Persian Proverb

2

The author examines whether exemptions for small businesses and small
transactions that appear in many regulations are economically effiCient.
The cost of regulation has both variable and flXed components. As
demonstrated by many empirical studies ofregulatory compliance costs,
the flXed costs of regulation, and some of the variable costs, are subject
to economies of scale that benefit larger firms and larger transactions.
Though it is harder to measure the benefits ofregulation, the benefits of
regulation generally vary in proportion to the size of the regulated firm
or transaction. The author develops a mathematical model of how the
costs and benefits of regulation vary with size and concludes that, no
matter what assumptions one makes in constructing that model, it
supports small business exemptions. However, when transactions costs,
the cumulative effect of regulation, and other real-world issues are
considered, the case for small business exemptions is more ambiguous.
I. INTRODUCTION
II. THE COST OF REGULATION
A. An Introduction to the Theory
B. Sources ofEconomies ofScale
1. Capital Expenditures
2. Information Costs
3. Reporting and Recordkeeping
4. Economies ofScale in Variable Costs
C. Empirical Studies ofCompliance Costs
III. THE BENEFITS OF REGULATION
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INTRODUCTION

Federal and state statutes and regulations contain numerous exemptions
for small businesses or small transactions,3 and politicians and small business
4
representatives frequently call for even more small business exemptions.

3 See, e.g., 15 U.S.c. § 18a(a)(2) (2000) (Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger notification and
waiting period requirements apply only if the acquired and acquiring companies exceed a
certain size); 15 U.S.C. § 78/(g)(l)(B) (2000), as modified by 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2003)
(registration under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 required for companies with total
assets exceeding $10 million and a class of equity securities held of record by 500 or more
shareholders); 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(I)(A) (2000) (excluding from the definition of "enterprise
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce" and therefore, from
enterprise coverage under the Fair Labor Standards Act, entities with a gross volume of
business less than $500,000); 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2) (2003) (exempting securities
offerings from registration under the Securities Act of 1933 if, among other conditions, the
amount of the offering does not exceed $1 million).
4 See, e.g., NFIB Cites EPA 'Betrayal' on Superfund Bill, BIRMINGHAM Bus. J., 2000
WL 17294356 (Oct. 6, 2000) (National Federation of Independent Business calling for an
exemption from Superfund liability for companies with 100 or fewer employees); Rebecca
Rose, New Threat to Workplace Bill, THE WEST AUSTRALIAN, June 21, 2000, at 43, available
at 2000 WL 23286044 (proposal to exempt small businesses from Australia's unfair
dismissal laws); Claire Oldfield, Tories Attack Labour on Bureaucracy, LONDON SUNDAY
TIMES (London), Dec. 26, 1999, at 2, available at 1999 WL 30050442 (Tories proposing to
exempt small businesses from whole classes of regulation); Kent Hoover, Businesses Seek
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Congress has been especially solicitous of small business. Two federal statutes,
the Regulatory Flexibility ActS and the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996,6 require regulatory agencies to consider
exemptions or reduced standards for small businesses. A primary purpose of
this legislation is "to make regulatory agencies sensitive to the impacts of their
regulations on small business entities."?
Regulators have responded with a variety of small business exemptions.
Some exemptions are global, freeing businesses or transactions from an entire
regulatory scheme, or most of a regulatory scheme. 8 Other exemptions are
narrower, limiting the application of only a single regulatory requirement. 9
"Small size" is measured differently for different exemptions. 10 Many
exemptions are based on the size of the regulated firm-measured by its
assets, II number of employees,12 or some other measure. 13 Other exemRtions
consider not the size of the firm, but the size of the regulated transaction. 4 Yet,
no matter how "small business" is defined, all of these exemptions share a
common belief that small size justifies an exemption from regulation.

Break on Paperwork Violations, DALLAS Bus. J., 1999 WL 24313537 (Nov. 19, 1999)
(discussing proposed legislation to exempt small businesses from penalties for first-time
violations of federal paperwork requirements).
5 5 U.S.c. §§ 601-612 (2000). See generally Doris S. Freedman et aI., The Regulatory
Flexibility Act: Orienting Federal Regulation to Small Business, 93 DICKINSON L. REv. 439
(1989) (discussing the requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act); Paul R. Verkuil, A
Critical Guide to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 1982 DUKE LJ. 213 (same).
6 5 U.S.c. § 601. See generally Thomas O. Sargentich, The Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 123 (1997) (discussing the requirements of
the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act).
7
THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY
ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 115 (1991).
8 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §12111(5)(A) (2000) (defining as "employers" covered by the
Americans with Disabilities Act only persons with 15 or more employees).
9 See, e.g., 29 U.S.c. § 1161(b) (2000) (exempting group health plans from the
continuation coverage requirement of ERISA if the employers covered by the plan have
fewer than 20 employees).
10 A 1981 survey found that the most commonly used size-based criteria were the
number of employees, operating revenue, assets, and market share. UNITED STATES
REGULATORY COUNCIL, TIERING REGULATIONS; A PRACTICAL GUIDE 4 (1981). But the
survey found a wide variety of size-based variables being used, including for example,
deposits, amount of goods produced, sales, income, number of accounts, number of
transactions, number of shareholders, and amount of energy used and produced. Id. at 9.
II See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (requiring companies with total assets exceeding
$10 million and meeting certain other requirements to comply with the reporting
requirements of The Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
12 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 121 11(5)(A) (2003) (defining "employer" for purposes of the
Americans with Disabilities Act to exclude companies with fewer than 15 employees).
13 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2000) (excluding an adviser from the registration
requirements of the Investment Advisers Act who, among other requirements, has fewer than
15 clients).
14 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2) (2003) (exempting securities offerings from
registration under the Securities Act of 1933 if, among other requirements, the amount of the
offering does not exceed $1 million).
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These ubiquitous small business exemptions 15 have received surprisingly
little attention from legal scholars and economists. Economic analyses of the
efficiency of particular regulations are common,16 but these studies seldom
focus on exemptions. Most early economic analyses of regulation "implicitly
treat[ed] the regulated industry as a homogenous entity" and paid little
attention to whether regulation had any differential effects on different firms in
the industry.17 More recent analyses consider whether regulation is more costly
for small businesses than for large businesses. 18 But few scholars have
attempted to use these empirical studies of the relative cost of regulation to
examine the theoretical underpinnings of small business exemptions.
Theoretical analyses of small business exemptions are uncommon. The few
analyses of particular small business exemptions do not focus on economic
theory, except in a very cursory way,19 and analyses of exemptions based on
transaction size, rather thanfirm size, are extremely rare?O
Reduced regulation of small businesses seems to have broad public
support,21 but is that reduced regulation supported by economic analysis or
purely a political plum?22 In this Article, I analyze the possible economic
justification for small business exemptions from government regulation. 23 I
accept the classical economic proposition that government regulation is
justified only if the benefits produced by the regulation exceed its costs24-in
15 For the sake of brevity, I will often refer to both types of exemptions-those based
on the size of the regulated entity and those based on the size of the regulated transactionas "small business" exemptions.
16 See, e.g., Steven A. Morrison et aI., Fundamental Flaws of Social Regulation: The
Case of Airplane Noise, 42 J.L. & ECON. 723 (1999) (cost-benefit analysis of the 1990
Airport Noise and Capacity Act); Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits
of Regulation: Review and Synthesis, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 233, 261-78 (1991) (summarizing
studies of the costs and benefits of regulation).
17 David Harrison, Jr., Regulation and Distribution, in ATIACKING REGULATORY
PROBLEMS: AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH IN THE 1980s 185, 188 (Allen R. Ferguson ed., 1981).
18 See infra Part II C.
19 See, e.g., Marc Linder, The Small-Business Exemption Under the Fair Labor

Standards Act: The "Original" Accumulation of Capital and the Inversion of Industrial
Policy, 6 J.L. & POL'y 403 (1998); Peggy H. Luh, Pay or Don't Play: Background Music
and the Small Business Exemption ofCopyright Law, 16 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 711 (1996).
20 An exception is C. Steven Bradford, Transaction Exemptions in the Securities Act of
1933: An Economic Analysis, 45 EMORY L.J. 591,611-22 (1996).
21 See Robert A. Peterson, et aI., Opinions about Government Regulation of Small
Business, 22 1. SMALL Bus. MGMT. 56, 59 (1984).
22 See CHARLES BROWN ET AL., EMPLOYERS LARGE AND SMALL 1-2, 65-87 (1990)
(arguing that small businesses possess substantial political resources); Ann M. Reilly, Small
Business' Big Clout, DUN'S REVIEW, Mar. 1980, at 69 (discussing the growing political clout
of small business on regulatory issues). But see MILTON Z. KAFOGLIS, Mandated Costs:
Impact on Small Business, in ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT-MANDATED COSTS III
(Robert F. Lanzillotti ed., 1978) (arguing that small businesses have not been politically
effective on regulatory issues).
23 Others have made non-economic arguments for supporting small firms. See, e.g.,
EDWARD GOODMAN, THE IMPACT OF SIZE: A STUDY OF HUMAN AND ECONOMIC VALUES IN
MODERN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1969). My paper is limited to economic arguments.
24 I do not assume that only measurable economic costs and benefits should be
included in the calculation. My examples and graphs show costs and benefits in dollars, but
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other words, only if the regulation produces a net benefit. 25 To focus on the
exemptions rather than the wisdom of a regulation as a whole, I make the
heroic assumption, undoubtedly false in at least some cases, that each
government regulation applied universally satisfies the net benefit criterion:
applied to all finns and transactions, the benefit of each regulation exceeds its
cost. The issue is then whether something unique about small transactions or
small entities justifies their exemption from the generally beneficial regulation.
Does the cost of regulation exceed the benefit for small transactions or small
entities as a class? If so, they should be exempted even though the regulation in
question produces a net benefit when applied to larger transactions or entities.
I develop a model of the costs and benefits of government regulation and
conclude that because of fixed compliance costs and economies of scale,26 size
matters in government regulation. How to measure size depends on the type of
regulation, but for typical government regulation, regulating entities or
transactions below a certain size may be inefficient. However, the transaction
costs associated with size-based exemptions must be considered in deciding
whether a small business or small transaction exemption is justified, and once
that is done, the conclusion is less categorical: small business exemptions may
or may not be efficient in particular cases.
II. THE COST OF REGULAnON

A.

An Introduction to the Theory

Government regulation involves various costs. Some of those costs, such
as the cost to produce a regulation, monitor compliance, and enforce the

only for ease of explanation. I also take no position on whether certain costs or benefits
should be weighed more heavily than others. I merely assume that, whatever costs and
benefits are included, and however one weighs them, regulation is justified only if one
believes the benefits of the regulation exceed the costs. Only an ordinal comparison is
required: is one particular state of the world (the regulated state) better than another (the
unregulated state)?
25 More precisely, given a choice among regulatory alternatives, government regulation
is economically efficient if, among all the possible alternatives, it produces the greatest net
benefit. See, e.g., EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS
134-58 (1978); EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM
OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 6-7 (1982). See also M.A. UrrON, THE ECONOMICS OF
REGULATING INDUSTRY 16 (1986) (for any improvement to take place, the net benefits
expected from government regulation must at least equal the sum of the enforcement costs
and transaction costs); Allen R. Ferguson & Murray L. Weidenbaum, The Problem of
Balancing the Costs and Benefits ofRegulation: Two Views, in THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT
REGULATION 153-54 (James F. Gatti ed., 1981) (a particular regulation or regulatory
program is worthwhile only if the benefits are worth the cost).
26 "There are scale economies in regulatory compliance if the average cost of
complying with regulation-measured by the total cost of complying with regulations
divided by firm size ... decreases with firm size." WILLIAM A. BROCK & DAVID S. EVANS,
THE ECONOMICS OF SMALL BUSINESSES: THEIR ROLE AND REGULATION IN THE U.S. ECONOMY

65 (1986).
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regulation, are incurred directly by the government. 27 Some of the costs of
regulation, primarily compliance costs, are incurred by regulated firms. 28 Some
of the costs of regulation are incurred by unregulated third parties, either
directly or more commonly, as part of the prices of the products and services
produced by regulated firms.
The cost of government regulation almost always includes both variable
and fixed components, with the variable costs being a function of the size of
the regulated transaction. 29 Assume, for example, that the hypothetical Federal
Footwear Agency mandates that all basketball shoes must have restricted
jumping ability to keep basketball players from being injured when they land.
Each shoe manufacturer will incur information costs to determine the
requirements of the regulation and research and development costs to modify
their shoes to comply. Those costs are fixed; they do not vary with the
particular manufacturer's output of shoes. But the cost of the additional
materials needed to modify the shoes is variable; it depends on the number of
basketball shoes each manufacturer produces.
The total cost of any government regulation can be modeled as follows:
Total Cost = FC + fc(Size) ,
where FC

= Fixed costs and

fc is a function of the size of the transaction regulated.

Figure 130 shows an example of what such a function might look likehow the total cost of a government regulation could vary with the size of the
transaction. The intercept on the vertical axis is FC and the slope of the line is
determined by the function.fc.
A cursory examination of this formula suggests that compliance with
government regulation involves economies of scale: the compliance cost per

27 These costs are passed on either to the general public in the form of taxes or to
regulated firms or others through devices such as licensing or user fees.
28 In essence, these regulatory costs are a form of taxation. Kenneth W. Clarkson et aI.,
Regulating Chrysler Out ofBusiness?, REG., Sept.-oct. 1979, at 44,3; Robert E. Berney &
James A. Swanson, The Regressive Impact of Governmental Regulations: Some Theoretical
and Empirical Evidence, AM. 1. SMALL BUS., Jan.-Mar. 1982, at 16, 17.
29 Fixed regulatory costs may be reduced by contracting with outside firms who
specialize in regulatory compliance. One report notes, for example, the sale to small firms of
standardized, "prototype" pension plans, which are cheaper than individually designed plans.
See J. TRUTKO ET AL., U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., COST AND IMPACT OF FEDERAL REGULATION
OF SMALL VERSUS LARGE BUSINESS RETIREMENT PLANS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY iv (1990).
This can reduce the regulatory compliance cost because the outside contractor can spread the
cost of developing the system over all of its clients. In effect, the regulated firm is
purchasing the "scale" necessary for economies of scale. However, in most cases the cost
remains fixed over at least some range. The cost is incurred by the outside contractor and
therefore, the price it charges does not depend on whether the regulated firm has 50, 75, or
100 employees. See, e.g., B. Peter Pashigian, A Theory of Prevention and Legal Defense
with an Application to the Legal Costs ofCompanies, 25 J.L. & ECON. 247, 261 (1982) (in a
study of 500 of the 750 largest firms on the Fortune list, finding economies of scale in inhouse and outside legal costs).
30 All figures appear at the end of the Article.
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unit of size decreases as the size of the transaction increases. 3\ If Total Cost
FC + fc(Size) , then the average cost per unit of size is:
Average Cost = FC/(Size) + fc(Size)/Size.

=

2004]

Since the fixed cost (FC) is a constant, the fixed cost component of
average cost declines as the size of the transaction increases. If the variable cost
is proportional to size, the average cost per unit of size declines.
B.

Sources ofEconomies ofScale

Examples of economies of scale in regulation are abundant. 32 Most of
those examples involve fixed costs, but economies of scale may also exist with
respect to some of the variable costs of regulation.
J.

Capital Expenditures

The most obvious examples of regulatory economies of scale involve
regulations that require businesses to incur capital expenditures. Many
regulations, particularly environmental regulations, require firms to purchase
capital-intensive technology to comply.33 Consider, for example, a requirement
that factories install scrubbers on their smokestacks to reduce emissions. The
cost to install the scrubbers does not depend on the output of the particular
factory.34 No matter what level of emissions actuall~ pass through the
smokestack, the cost to install the scrubbers does not vary. 5
Fixed costs like this are not unique to environmental regulation. Any
regulation that requires a firm to incur capital costs will result in economies of
scale if the capital cost does not vary by outpUt. 36 For example, if OSHA

31 This will not be the case for all government regulation, of course. Sometimes,
government regulation has a greater impact on large businesses than on smaller firms.
Thomas W. Ross, for example, notes that the impetus for the Robinson-Patman Act came
from small businesses in reaction to chain stores, particularly grocery chain stores. Thomas
W. Ross, Winners and Losers Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 27 1.L. & ECON. 243, 24344 (1984). Ross found that passage of the Act had a comparatively negative impact on larger
grocery store chains. Id. at 254-58. See also Steven A. Morrison & Robert 1. Newman,
Hours of Operation Restrictions and Competition Among Retail Firms, 21 ECON. INQUIRY
107, 114 (1983) (finding that chain stores gained market share when regulations restricting
the hours during which stores could open for business were relaxed).
32 For more general discussions of economies of scale and their sources, see CLIFF
PRATTEN, THE COMPETITNENESS OF SMALL FIRMS 13-19 (1991); C.F. PRATTEN, ECONOMIES
OF SCALE IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 3-13 (University of Cambridge Department of
Economics, Occasional Paper No. 28, 1971); Edward H. Chamberlin, Proportionality,
Divisibility, and Economies ofScale, 62 Q.J. ECON. 229 (1948).
33 Harrison, supra note 17, at 191.
34 As with all fixed costs, this cost is fixed only over a certain range: the greater the
output, the more smokestacks a single factory will have, and the more scrubbers needed.
But, within the range of output requiring a single smokestack, the installation cost is fixed.
35 The cost to maintain the scrubbers undoubtedly includes a variable cost. The greater
the emissions passing through the smokestack, the greater the maintenance costs. However,
a substantial part of the cost of the scrubber is fixed.
36 Economies of scale with respect to capital costs can result in regulation having a
greater impact on small businesses in other ways. Due to economies of scale in capital costs,
small businesses tend to be more labor-intensive and less capital-intensive than larger firms.
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requires firms to make portable toilets available to workers outdoors, that
capital cost is, over at least some range of output,37 fixed. The problem, as with
most economies of scale, is one of indivisibility.38 If OSHA requires one
portable toilet for every 50 workers, it cannot require 1/50th of a toilet for a firm
with one worker, 2/50 th of a toilet for a firm with two workers, and so on.
Indivisible capital resources like this "can only be used efficiently when the
scale of activity is large enough to employ them fully. ,,39
Expenses other than purchases of technology or equipment can also
involve fixed costs. For example, government regulation prohibiting
discrimination in hiring may force a firm to revise its job descriptions and job
4o
application forms. The cost to rewrite those job descriptions and forms does
not depend on how many people the company plans to hire. The cost to write a
job description for "administrative assistant," for example, is the same whether
the firm hires ten administrative assistants a year or only one every ten years.
2. Information Costs
Information costs are possibly the most overlooked costs of government
regulation. Firms must keep abreast of new or revised regulations, interpret
them to determine whether they apply, and ascertain what the firm must do to
comply. Federal laws and regulations are often complex-as one congressional
witness complained, "written...by lawyers for la~ers."4I Some agencies have
published special handbooks for small businesses,4 but the cost to monitor and
interpret regulatory changes can still be substantia1. 43 There are economies of

Regulations increasing labor expenses thus have a greater impact on small firms even if
variable labor costs are constant across all levels of production. Berney & Swanson, supra
note 28, at 19.
37 As measured by the number of workers.
38 See BARRY A. STEIN, SIZE, EFFICIENCY AND COMMUNITY ENTERPRISE I (1974).

Id.
40 See, e.g., Entrepreneurship in America: Excessive Governmental Burdens on Small
Business: Field Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Small Bus., 104th Congo 76, (1995)
[hereinafter Entrepreneurship in America] (testimony of Deeadra White) (vice-president of a
39

90-employee jewelry company claiming to have spent $4,000 to revise the firm's application
form and job descriptions in response to the ADA).
41
The Impact of Federal Occupational Safety and Health Requirements on Small
Business: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Reg., Bus. Opportunities, and Energy of the
House Comm. on Small Bus., 102d Congo 38 (1992) (testimony of John B. Moran).
42 See, e.g., OFFICE OF POLICY, ECONOMICS, AND INNOVATION, ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES FOR SMALL BUSINESSES: A
RESOURCE GUIDE (2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/sbo/ea-resourceguide.pdf;
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, OSHA
HANDBOOK
FOR
SMALL
BUSINESSES
(1996),
available
at
http://www.osha.govlPublications/Osha2209.pdf.
43 See, e.g., Entrepreneurship in America: supra note 40, at 81 (statement of Deeadra
White) (jewelry company with 90 employees spends $2,500 annually for publications,
seminars, and attorneys' fees to interpret regulations); Small Business Perspectives on
Mandates, Paperwork, and Regulation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Small Bus., 105th
Congo 66 (1997) (testimony of Bob Spence) (laundry and textile rental company with 350
employees planned to spend $25,000-$30,000 "just to make sure we are in compliance with
100 percent of the OSHA regulations."); TRUTKO ET AL., supra note 29, at v-vi (small
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scale in this process because the cost of interpreting a regulation does not
depend on who is interpreting it. 44 As a result, small businesses are at a
45
disadvantage in monitoring and interpreting regulations.
3. Reporting and Recordkeeping
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements are another major source of
economies of scale. 46 Almost every federal regulation includes paperwork
requirements,47 and the enormous cost of those requirements is certainly no
secret. 48 In 1997, the vice-president of a family-owned laundry -and textile
rental business with 350 employees claimed that it cost his company rough~
$210,000 a year just to comply with regulatory paperwork requirements. 9
Often, the cost to compile the necessary information and prepare the required
reports, or at least a substantial part of that cost, is fixed; the number of reports

pension plan providers claimed that keeping up with and understanding changes in the law
was the top problem with pension regulation).
44 OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, REpORT ON THE
CHANGING BURDEN OF REGULATION, PAPERWORK, AND TAX COMPLIANCE ON SMALL
BUSINESS, reprinted in The Cost of Federal Regulations on Small Business, Joint Hearing
Before The S. Comm. on Small Bus. and the House Comm. on Small Bus., 104th Congo 46
(1995):
A significant body of knowledge must be gained by a firm to determine whether a
regulation applies to it, whether it is in compliance, or what action must be taken to be
in compliance. For example, a firm must first learn that a form is required by rule,
determine if the firm is required to submit that form, and then determine how to
complete the form correctly. These fixed information-gathering costs are the same for
all firms, whether large or small.
See also Pashigian, supra note 29, at 261 (finding economies of scale in both in-house and
outside legal costs in a study of 500 of the top 750 Fortune companies); KAFOGLIS, supra
note 22, at 117.
45 Entrepreneurship in America, supra note 40, at 17-18 (statement of Mary Garza);

Impact ofFederal Regulation on Small Business: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Special
Small Bus. Probs. of the House Comm. on Small Bus., 96th Cong 2 (1979) [hereinafter
Impact ofFederal Regulation on Small Business] (statement of Andy Ireland); Jack Farris,
NFIB Debuts Legal Help on Businesses Issues, 17 BIRMINGHAM Bus. 1.. 27 (May 5, 2000).
But see ROLAND 1. COLE & PAUL SOMMERS, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., COMPLYING WITH
GOVERNMENT REQUIREMENTS: THE COSTS TO SMALL AND LARGER BUSINESSES (1981)
(finding few significant differences in how adequate small and large firms believed their
information about regulatory requirements to be).
46 Impact ofFederal Regulation on Small Business, supra note 45, at 124 (statement of
Dr. Milton Kafoglis, Professor of Economics, Emory University); KAFOGLIS, supra note 22,
at 117.
47 "Virtually every federal agency issues a steady stream of recordkeeping and
reporting requirements, most of them related to regulations. Indeed, it is difficult to separate
the impact of paperwork requirements from that of regulations." RICHARD LESHER,
MELmoWN ON MAIN STREET: WHY SMALL BUSINESS IS LEADING THE REVOLUTION AGAINST
BIG GOVERNMENT 35 (1996).
48 See generally Federal Paperwork Requirements: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Gov't Reg. and Paperwork of the S. Select Comm. on Small Bus., 96th Congo I (1979)
[hereinafter Federal Paperwork Requirements] (statement of John C. Culver) (containing

several estimates of the impact of federal paperwork requirements).
49

Small Business Perspectives on Mandates, Paperwork, and Regulation, supra note

43, at 61 (testimony of Bob Spence).
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required and the time necessary to complete the reports does not vary with the
size of the business.50
Consider a simple government recordkeeping provision that requires
employers to collect and file certain personal information on all new hires. Part
of the cost to comply with that requirement is variable. The cost of the time to
collect the information for each new employee is obviously a function of the
number of employees hired (e.g., thirty minutes per new employee), as is the
cost of the paper on which the information is printed (e.g., two sheets of paper
per new employee). But some of the regulatory costs are fixed. The firm must
learn exactly what the regulation requires, develop a form to collect the
required information, train the firm's employees to collect the data, and
develop a monitoring system to ensure that the company complies. Whether the
company hires five or five hundred employees, those costs remain roughly the
51
same.
52
Consider another example: the requirement in the Securities Act of
53
1933 that a company selling securities file with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) a disclosure document known as a registration statement,54
and provide part of that registration statement, the prospectus, to investors.55
Many of the costs to comply with that requirement do not depend on the dollar
amount of the securities the company is selling (the size of the transaction).
Companies must prepare essentially the same disclosure document, incurring
many of the same accounting and legal costs, whether their offering is for $1 or
$100 million.56 Those accounting and legal costs are fixed. Other regulatory
costs depend on the size of the offering. The larger the offering, the greater the
number of offerees, at least on average, and thus the greater the cost to print the
prospectus and distribute it to investors. The filing fee charged by the SEC also
varies depending on the size of the offering.
Even a regulatory scheme that might on its face seem to involve only a
variable cost-the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act5?--can involve fixed costs. Obviously, the cost of the higher
wages required by the Act is variable; it is a direct function of the number of
employee hours. But even a statute like the Fair Labor Standards Act has a

50 Overregulation of Small Business: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov't Reg. of
the S. Select Comm. on Small Bus., 94th Congo 30 (1976) [hereinafter Overregulation of
Small Business] (statement of Donald S. Shoup).
51 As with most fixed costs, of course, these costs are fixed only over a limited size
range.
52 For a more complete treatment of this example, see C. Steven Bradford, Securities
Regulation and Small Business: Rule 504 and the Case for an Unconditional Exemption, 5 1.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 1,23-33 (2001); Bradford, supra note 20, at 614-22.
53 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z-3 (2003).
54 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (2003).
55 See generally 15 U.S.C. 77j (a) (2003).
56 The SEC has moved in the direction suggested by this paper, developing several
different registration forms, some of which are less burdensome and are available only to
small business issuers. Compare SEC Form S-I, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (2003) to Form SB-l,
17 C.F.R. § 239.9 (2003).
57 29 U.S.c. §§ 201-219 (2000).
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fixed cost component. To ensure that it pays employees the federally required
compensation, an employer must establish a recordkeeping system to keep
careful records of the hours each employee works and must train managers in
the operation of that system. These costs are at least partially fixed.
4. Economies ofScale in Variable Costs
As a result of specialization of functions in large finns,58 economies of
scale can also arise with respect to the variable costs of regulation.59 Consider,
for example, the recordkeeping requirements associated with antidiscrimination
laws. If the company has enough employees to justify it, it can hire a full-time
coordinator whose only function is to collect and report this data. Smaller
companies would not need a full-time specialist, so the reporting would be
done by a less efficient generalist. 6o Economies of scale can also arise from
other variable costs simply because resources cost more per unit in smaller
amounts. 61

C. Empirical Studies ofCompliance Costs
An extensive body of empirical research examines the costs of complying

with government regulations and, in particular, whether there are economies of
scale in regulatory compliance. Many of those studies were funded by the
United States Small Business Administration. 62 I will only briefly discuss a few
aspects of that research; a full review is beyond the scope of this Article. 63
This empirical research falls into three categories. Some of the studies are
ex ante, done before the regulation in question was adopted. These studies rely

STEIN, supra note 38, at 2.
59 See Hendrik S. Houthakker, Economics and Biology: Specialization and Speciation,
in THE RETURN TO INCREASING RETURNS 61, 62 (James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon eds.,
1994) (discussing why specialization of labor produces increasing returns to scale); E.A.G.
ROBINSON, THE STRUCTURE OF COMPETITIVE INDUSTRY 14-17, 34-36 (1958) (same).
60 "In a large business the compiling and submission of required reports is the specific
job of certain individuals. In a small business it is often the owner-manager who must do it,
at the expense of devoting his time and energies to making the business go." Overregulation
of Small Business, supra note 50, at 30 (statement of Donald S. Shoup). See also Federal
Paperwork Requirements, supra note 48, at 12 (statement of Wayne G. Granquist, Associate
Director, Management and Regulatory Policy, Office of Management and Budget) (stating
that small businesses have a particularly difficult time with government requirements for
information due to the lack of specialization in personnel). See also JACK FAUCETT
ASSOCIATES, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN REGULATORY COMPLIANCE:
EVIDENCE OF THE DIFFERENTIAL IMPACTS OF REGULATION BY FIRM SIZE 29, 29-32 (1984)
(stating that recurring requirements of OSHA's occupational noise exposure regulations are
more expensive for small businesses because of a lack of in-house specialization).
61 STEIN, supra note 38, at 2-3.
62 See, e.g., MICROECONOMIC APPLICATIONS, INC., U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., IMPACTS
OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, PAPERWORK, AND TAX REQUIREMENTS ON SMALL BUSINESS
(1998), available at http://www.sba.gov/ADVO/research/rsI86tot.pdf; JACK FAUCETT
ASSOCIATES, supra note 60.
63 A survey of much of the literature appears in OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, supra note 44,
at 33-82.
58

12

THE JOURNAL OF SMALL & EMERGING BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 8:1

64
on costs estimated by the regulatory agencr in the course of rulemaking.
6
These cost estimates may be inaccurate,
and proposed regulations are
sometimes revised significantly after the costs are estimated. Moreover, the
agency proposing the regulations may have a political incentive to
66
underestimate costS.
Finally, agencies sometimes make the issue of scale
economies disappear by assumin~ that costs are proportional to some measure
of size such as labor or revenues. 7
The other two types of studies use ex post data, but they have their own
problems. One type of ex post study uses cost data provided by regulated firms;
these studies simply ask firms how much they spend to comply with a
particular regulation or regulation generally.68 The regulated firms have little
incentive to incur the costs necessary to collect accurate information, and they
69
have a strong political incentive to overestimate the cost ofregulation.
Other ex post studies do not attempt to measure costs directly but compare
the pre-regulation structure and performance of a regulated industry to its post70
regulation structure and performance. These studies consider data such as the

64 See, e.g., MICROECONOMICS APPLICATIONS, INC., supra note 62, at 8 (containing
analyses of many different regulations relying on agency-generated cost estimates).
65 Such ex ante projections rely on informed guesses about how firms will comply with
the regulatory requirements. See, e.g., THOMAS D. HOPKINS, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF
AMERICAN BUSINEss, REGULATORY COSTS IN PROFILE (1996), available at
http://wc.wustl.edu/csab/CSAB%20pubspdfOIo20files/Policy%20Studies/ps I32%20hopkins.pdf.
66 BROCK & EVANS, supra note 26, at 104. See also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small is Not
Beautiful: The Case Against Special Regulatory Treatment of Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L.
REv. 537, 561-62 (1998) (stating that agencies devote a disproportionate amount of
enforcement resources to larger firms). That may be a valid complaint if the purpose is to
measure businesses' actual compliance costs (although violating the law imposes a cost in
the form of increased risk and that cost is not measured if only out-of-pocket costs are
included). But if the purpose is to design an efficient regulation, an agency should compare
the actual cost of complying with the standard to the benefit of the standard. An agency
should not adopt a regulation whose cost exceeds its benefit merely because some firms will
ignore the regulation.
67 MICROECONOMIC ApPLICATIONS, INC., supra note 62, at 8.
68 See, e.g., TRUTKO ET AL., supra note 29, at vii; THOMAS D. HOPKINS, U.S. SMALL
Bus. ADMIN., A SURVEY OF REGULATORY BURDENS 1 (1995); Kenneth W. Chilton & Murray
L. Weidenbaum, Government Regulation: The Small Business Burden, 1. SMALL Bus.
MGMT., Jan. 1982, at 4; COLE & SOMMERS, supra note 45; ROLAND J. COLE & PAUL
SOMMERS, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN, COSTS OF COMPLIANCE IN SMALL AND MODERATE-SIZED
BUSINESSES (1980).
69 BROCK & EVANS, supra note 26, at 104; HOPKINS, supra note 65, at 20.
70 See, e.g., Keith B. Leffler & Raymond Sauer, Jr., The Effects of the Advertising
Substantiation Program on Advertising Agencies, in EMPIRICAL ApPROACHES TO CONSUMER
PROTECTION ECONOMICS 177, 177-95 (Pauline M. Ippolito & David T. Scheffman eds.,
1984); Richard S. Higgins & Fred S. McChesney, An Economic Analysis of the FTC's Ad
Substantiation Program, in EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO CONSUMER PROTECTION ECONOMICS
197-211, (Pauline M. Ippolito & David T. Scheffman eds., 1984); George R. Neumann &
Jon P. Nelson, Safety Regulation and Firm Size: Effects of the Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act of 1969, 25 J.L. & ECON. 183 (1982); Peter Linneman, The Effects of Consumer Safety
Standards: The 1973 Mattress Flammability Standard, 23 J.L. & ECON. 461 (1980); B002ALLEN & HAMILTON, INC., U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATIONS ON SMALL BUSINESS (1982).
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number of firms in the industry and their relative size and stock returns to
determine how regulation has affected the industry. A major problem for these
studies, of course, is distinguishing the effect of regulation from other
economic effects on firms in the regulated industry. 7 I In addition, it is often
difficult to obtain reliable data on smaller firms in an industry,72 so the effects
of regulation may be measured across a relatively narrow range of firm sizes.
Some of these studies also have statistical problems: missing tests of statistical
significance,73 or questionable statistical assumptions. 74
Regardless of the type of study, other problems complicate the analysis.
First, this literature usually considers only the compliance costs incurred by
regulated firms and does not include other regulatory costs such as the costs
incurred by the regulatory agency to enforce the regulation, costs that may also
vary with the size of the regulated firm or transaction. 75 Agency enforcement
costs are probably significantly less than compliance costs, 6 but they are not
trivial and should be included as one of the costs of regulation.
More importantly, many of these regulations include full or partial
exemptions for small businesses or small transactions. This makes the
comparison of costs incurred by large and small firms virtually meaningless
because the large and small firms are not subject to the same requirements.
What the studies actually measure is the difference between the cost for large
firms to comply with the full regulation and the cost for small firms to comply
with a diluted regulation or no regulation at all. It is not surprising that some
studies find no economies of scale or even diseconomies of scale. 77 What is
surprising is that significant economics of scale exist in some cases in spite of
the diminished requirements for small businesses. 78
BROCK & EVANS, supra note 26, at 104.
/d.
73 ld. at 107 (criticizing a Booz-Allen & Hamilton study of environmental regulations
for not testing for statistical significance or reporting sufficient data to allow others to do
so); id. at 123 (similar criticism ofa 1981 Cole and Sommers study).
74 See id. at 111-12 (criticizing a study of environmental regulation by Pashigian for
assuming homoskedasticity); id. at 117-18 (criticizing the specification of Pashigian's
regression model); id. at 121 (criticizing a 1978 Cole and Sommers article for not controlling
for heteroskedasticity).
75 See generally MICROECONOMIC APPLICATIONS, INC., supra note 62 (consisting of
studies focusing on compliance costs); JACKFAUCETI ASSOCIATES, supra note 60 (same).
76 See CLYDE WAYNE CREWS JR., TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL
POLICYMAKER'S SNAPSHOT OF THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STATE 2 (2000), available at
http://www.cei.orglpdf/2291.pdf (estimating total compliance costs of $758 billion and
agency enforcement costs of $18.8 billion). See also W. MARK CRAIN & THOMAS D.
HOPKINS, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS ON SMALL FIRMS 6
(2001), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs207tot.pdf(stating that spending by
federal regulatory agencies on regulatory activities was $18.9 billion in 2000).
77 See MICROECONOMIC APPLICATIONS, INC., supra note 62, at iv (of 13 industryregulation pairs showing no economies of scale, 4 involved complete or partial exemptions
for small entities and 2 were cases where small entities could avoid regulatory costs through
appropriate strategic decisions); BROCK & EVANS, supra note 26, at 136-39 (fmding no
widespread disparate impact of regulation on small business and suggesting de jure and de
facto small business exemptions as a reason).
78 See, e.g., MICROECONOMIC ApPLICATIONS, INC., supra note 62, at 264.
71

72
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Given the limitations of these empirical studies, one should hesitate to rely
on any sin~le study to demonstrate economies of scale in regulatory
compliance.? But the available studies involve several different types of data
and several different methodologies, and most of those studies point in the
direction that both common sense and economic theory predict. Cumulatively,
these studies support three general, empirical conclusions:
(1) For many regulations, there are economies of scale in regulatory
compliance. An inverse relationship exists between the size of a regulated firm
and the per-unit cost of compliance. 8o
(2) The economies of scale appear to be due primarily to fixed costs,8] but
also, in some cases, to economies in the variable costs of regulatory
compliance. 82

79 For specific criticisms of many of the early studies of firm size and regulatory costs,
see BROCK & EVANS, supra note 26, at 105-35.
80 A recent study of two dozen regulations concluded that "most regulations do impose
costs on small entities that are disproportionately high-sometimes proportionately very
much larger. Most of the exceptions appear to be due either to regulatory flexibility
measures or to flaws in the regulatory analysis." MICROECONOMIC APPLICATIONS, INC., supra
note 62, at v.
Some of the studies supporting this conclusion examine firms' total regulatory costs. Crain
and Hopkins, for example, estimated that the average firm with fewer than twenty
employees spent $6,975 per employee in 2000 to comply with all federal regulations, which
was 60 % higher than the per-employee figures for larger firms. CRAIN & HOPKINS, supra
note 76, at i. See also COLE & SOMMERS, supra note 45, at 113 (finding greater reported
compliance costs per dollar of sales in small firms than in larger firms); COLE & SOMMERS,
supra note 68, at 27 (finding greater reported compliance costs per dollar of revenue in
smaller firms than in larger firms).
Other studies consider, on an individual basis, the costs of a number of different regulations.
See MICROECONOMIC ApPLICATIONS, INC., supra note 62 (including studies of a number of
different regulations showing economies of scale in compliance costs); JACK FAUCETT
ASSOCIATES, supra note 60, at 29 (same).
Finally, many of the studies find economies of scale as to one particular regulation or group
of regulations. See, e.g., TRUTKO ET AL., supra note 29, at vii-xi (finding substantially higher
set-up and administrative costs for regulated pension plans in a 25-participant firm than in a
200-participant firm); Gregory E. Elliehausen & Robert D. Kurtz, Scale Economies in
Compliance Costs for Federal Consumer Credit Regulations, 1 J. FIN. SERVS. REs. 147
(1988) (finding large scale economies in complying with federal consumer credit
regulations, but only at the lowest levels of lending); James R. Chelius & Robert S. Smith,
Firm Size and Regulatory Compliance Costs: The Case of Workers' Compensation
Insurance, 6 1. POLICY ANALYSIS & MGMT. 193, 201 (1987) (finding that the smallest firms
have the highest workers' compensation costs per dollar of loss); Neil B. Murphy,
Economies ofScale in the Cost of Compliance with Consumer Credit Protection Laws: The
Case of the Implementation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, 10 J. BANK REs.
250 (1980) (finding substantial economies of scale in the cost of compliance with the Act).
81 See, e.g., MICROECONOMIC ApPLICATIONS, INC., supra note 62 (most likely reason for
economies of scale in the OSHA permit-required confined spaces standard is high fixed
costs in equipment purchases); id. at 112 (economies of scale in EPA regulation of
perchloroethylene in dry cleaning relate primarily to engineering costs and
recordkeeping/reporting requirements).
82 See, e.g., JACK FAUCETT ASSOCIATES, supra note 60, at 29-32 (economies of scale in
recurring requirements of OSHA's occupational noise exposure regulations); id. at 49,51-54
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(3) The economies of scale appear to persist over time. The~ are not shortrun transition costs created by firms adjusting to new regulation. 3
Probably the most significant study not to find any substantial economies
of scale in regulatory compliance was Brock and Evans's 1986 study of
pollution abatement costS. 84 Even the results of this study are ambiguous,
because their study shows that (l) industries subject to the greatest levels of
enforcement experienced large increases in the average size of establishments,
and (2) industries with relatively large increases in capital costs as a result of
environmental re~lation also experienced large increases in average
establishment size. 5 In other words, larger businesses become more dominant
in the most regulated industries. In addition, Brock and Evans themselves
suggest that the lack of any disparate impact on small business is due to de jure
or de facto exemptions for smaller businesses. 86 Thus, the Brock and Evans
study does not strongly refute the general conclusions stated above.
III. THE BENEFITS OF REGULAnON
It is much easier to measure the costs of regulation than to measure the
benefits. "In most cases, benefit estimates of social regulations probably are
best viewed as 'guesstimates. ",87 However, even though we cannot measure the
benefits exactly, one characteristic of these benefits is clear: the benefits of
regulation are almost completely variable. The total benefit of regulation is a
direct function of the amount of regulated conduct.
A few examples illustrate this point. The total benefit of applying
antidiscrimination or minimum wage rules to a particular employer depends on
the number of hours employees work. If the business employs no one, the rules
are completely ineffective and produce no benefits. 88 Applying a minimum
wage law to an employer with one-thousand full-time employees produces a
greater gain than applying the same requirement to an employer with five fulltime employees.

(economies of scale in operating and maintenance costs under EPA's interim primary
drinking water regulations).
83 See, e.g., Thomas J. Dean et aI., Environmental Regulation as a Barrier to the
Formation of Small Manufacturing Establishments: A Longitudinal Examination, 40 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 56, 62-68 (2000) (stating that the entry-deterring impact of
environmental regulations on small firm formation persisted during the period studied).
84 BROCK & EVANS, supra note 26, at 168-77.
85 ld. at 175.
86 ld. at 181.
87 Hahn & Hird, supra note 16, at 254.
88 Some legal scholars contend that protective legislation serves an expressive function
that produces benefits independent of the enforcement of the legislation. See generally
Symposium: The Expressive Dimension of Governmental Action: Philosophical and Legal
Perspectives, 60 MD. L. REv. 465, 465-784 (2001). If these benefits really are independent
of actual enforcement, exemptions should not affect them. The expressive function of the
legislation should be the same whether or not particular firms are exempted. If, on the other
hand, these so-called expressive benefits do vary with the actual extent of regulation, they
are just another variable benefit to include in the calculation.
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The total benefit of requiring a factory to install pollution controls depends
on the output of the factory. The greater the output, the more pollution absent
the controls, and therefore the greater the benefit produced by the controls. If
the factory is closed and has no output at all, installing pollution controls will
not produce any benefit. 89
The total benefit of requiring an employer to make accommodations for
the handicapped also varies with the number of affected individuals. For
example, a requirement that buildings have elevators to accommodate the
disabled will usually produce a greater benefit in a building that ten thousand
people enter each day than in a building that only two people enter. 90
The benefit of securities disclosure also varies with size. In the case of the
offering-related disclosure of the Securities Act of 1933,91 the larger the
offering, the more money investors could lose, and the more they benefit from
accurate information about the offering. In the case of the continuous
disclosure requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,92 the greater
the dollar amount of outstanding securities, the greater the benefit of accurate
information.
Almost all government regulation appears to produce benefits that vary
with size. The relevant measure of size will vary from one regulation to
another. 93 It may be the number of employees for wage and hour legislation,
the dollar amount of a securities offering for securities regulation, or the output
of a factory for environmental controls. But the conclusion is the same. The
total benefit of government regulation is a direct function of some measure of
the size of the regulated conduct:
Total Benefit

= fb(Size),

where fb denotes some function of the size of the regulated transaction
andfb(O) = 0.

94

If the function is linear, a graph of this relationship would look something like
Figure 2. The slope of the line is determined by the functionjb.

89 The person installing the controls will benefit, but this benefit is offset by the
foregone alternative use of the money paid to install the controls. See, e.g., HENRY HAZLITT,
ECONOMICS IN ONE LESSON 23-24 (Arlington House Publishers 1979) (1946).
90 This assumes that the selection of people entering the building is random. If the only
two people entering the building are disabled, the benefit could be greater in the smaller
building.
91 15 U.S.c. §§ 77a-77z-3, supra note 53.
92 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2003).
93 See infra Part V.
94 This assumes, of course, that the regulation has some effect on firms' behavior.
Requiring firms to pay a minimum wage produces no benefit if the firms already pay more
than the minimum wage. Limiting the pollutants a firm may discharge produces no benefit if
all firms already operate within the limits. In those cases, the benefit of regulation is always
zero, regardless of the size of the transaction.
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IV. CREATING A MODEL FOR SMALL BUSINESS EXEMPTIONS:
COMPARING COSTS AND BENEFITS

A.

The Basic Model ofRegulatory Efficiency

We now have a model of both the costs and the benefits of regulation. The
total cost of regulation is the sum of its fixed cost plus the variable cost, which
depends on the size of the transaction: Total Cost = FC + fc(Size). The total
benefit of regulation is completely variable with the size of the transaction:
Total Benefit = jb(Size). If, as argued supra, regulation is justified only when its
benefit exceeds its cost, an exemption should be available for a particular size
of transaction if :
FC + fc(Size) > jb(Size).95
So far, I have not attempted to define the two functions in this formula.
We know that both the total cost and the total benefit of regulation increase
with size, but we do not know what either one of these relationships looks like.
In fact, given the various types of regulation and the different types of costs
and benefits, there is no reason to expect a single, uniform relationship between
size and either total cost or total benefit. Fortunately, the case for a small
transaction exemption does not depend on the particular nature of the cost and
benefit functions. In Section B, I show that small business exemptions are
efficient if those relationships are linear. In Section C, I assume nonlinear
relationships and reach the same conclusion. The exact nature of the cost and
benefit functions is irrelevant; for any plausible cost or benefit functions, an
exemption based on size can be efficient.
B.

Linear Cost and Benefit Functions

Assume that both the variable costs and the benefits of a regulation are
directly proportional to the size of the regulated transaction. In other words,
both functions in the cost-benefit equation, fc and jb, are linear. The variable
cost and the total benefit are some constant multiples of the size of the
transaction. Figure 3 illustrates such linear costs and benefits.
Let a represent the cost multiple: the variable cost of the regulation is
simply a times the size of the transaction, however we measure size. Therefore
a is the slope of the cost line in Figure 3. Let f3 represent the benefit multiple:
the benefit of the regulation is simply f3 times the size of the transaction. f3 is
the slope of the benefit line in Figure 3. Then, an exemption based on the size
of the transaction is justified if:
FC + (a * Size) > (f3 * Size)
We can solve this equation for the size of the transaction:
Size < FC/(f3 - a)
95 Exemptions are not costless and the transaction costs of exemptions must be
considered in deciding whether an exemption is efficient. See irifra Part VI. To simplify the
discussion, I will assume for now that transaction costs are zero.

18

THE JOURNAL OF SMALL & EMERGING BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 8:1

Any transaction smaller than the size indicated by the formula, which is the
size at which the cost and benefit lines intersect in Figure 3, should be
exempted from the particular regulation. 96
C

Nonlinear Cost and Benefit Functions

There is no particular reason to believe the relationships between size and
cost or size and benefit are always linear. In fact, there are plausible arguments
that those relationships are not linear. In this section, I briefly consider the
implications of nonlinear models, and show that the basic conclusion is
unchanged: a small transaction exemption is still efficient.

1.

Nonlinear benefits

a. Richard Pierce's Argument
Professor Richard Pierce has argued that small businesses are responsible
97
for a disproportionate amount of the wrongs that regulation seeks to prevent.
Small businesses are often exempted from regulation, so it is not surprising that
they are more likely to engage in activities that would be unlawful for larger
businesses. 98 Pierce concedes this point but argues small businesses would be
disproportionately responsible for such wrongs even in the absence of such
exemptions. 99 If Pierce is correct, the relationship between the benefits of
regulation and the size of the transaction would be nonlinear-the smaller the
transaction, the greater the average benefit of regulation per unit of size. The
relationship between size and the benefit of regulation would look something
like the graph in Figure 4. 100 The average benefit of regulation per unit of size
would be greater for small transactions than for larger ones because the harm
regulation prevents is proportionately greater in small transactions. The total
benefit of regulation still increases as the size of the transaction increases, but
at a declining rate.

96 The formula works only if the variable benefit of regulation (fJ) exceeds the variable
cost (a), but this must be true given our assumption that the regulation is generally efficient.
If a ~ /3, regulation is never economically efficient, regardless of the size of the transaction:
No matter how large the transaction, the total benefit of the regulation will never exceed the
total cost.
97 See Pierce, supra note 66, at 561. See also Linder, supra note 19, at 414
("[E]xempting the very employers who are most likely not to pay the minimum wage turns
into a farce the carefully orchestrated debates over raising a minimum wage that will not
apply to those who need it most.").
98 See Randy Becker & Vernon Henderson, Effects of Air Quality Regulations on
Polluting Industries, 108 J. POL. ECON. 379,415 (2000) (finding that air quality regulation
promoted the "growth of small, relatively dirty (unregulated) plants.").
99 Pierce, supra note 66, at 561. Even absent exemptions, small firms may have a
higher noncompliance rate. See, e.g., Linneman, supra note 70, at 474. But see COLE &
SOMMERS, supra note 45, at 72 (reporting results consistent with small firms being more
likely to comply with regulatory requirements).
100 An equation consistent with Pierce's view could take many forms. A simple
function that would produce a relationship like this is Total Benefit = p(Size)lI2, where P is a
constant. If we continue to assume a linear cost model, transactions up to the size where Fe
+ a(Size) = p(Size)//2 should be exempted.
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No complicated mathematics is required to show that a small transaction
exemption is still efficient. The benefit equation passes through the origin and,
as the size of the transaction approaches zero, the total cost approaches Fe (the
fixed cost), some positive number. Thus, for a near-zero transaction size, the
total cost clearly exceeds the total benefit. The total benefit of regulation must
exceed the total cost at some point because of the assumption that the
regulation is generally efficient. Therefore, the total benefit and total cost
curves must intersect somewhere, as illustrated in Figure 5. Transactions less
than that size should be exempted because the total cost of regulating them is
greater than the total benefit.
Professor Pierce's argument against small business exemptions apparently
fails to consider the marginal impact of regulating small businesses. "If a
regulatory rule yields benefits that exceed its costs," Professor Pierce writes,
"then it is a good rule. . . . If, by contrast, a regulatory rule costs more to
implement than the value of its benefits, then we should not have the rule." 10 I
Pierce neglects the possibility that, even if a globally applicable regulation
produces a net benefit, a tailored rule exempting some small businesses might
produce an even greater net benefit. The economic object of regulation is not a
rule that produces a net benefit (any rule whose benefits exceed its costs), but
to produce a rule that maximizes net benefit.
b. The Extreme Populist View
Some populists, such as Ralph Nader, take a position diametrically
opposed to Pierce's. They argue that big business, not small business, is
responsible for a disproportionate amount of society's illS. 102 Under the
populist view, most of the benefit of regulation would arise from its application
to larger firms and transactions, because that segment is where most of the
harm occurs. If big businesses are disproportionately responsible for the
regulated problems, the average benefit of regulation per unit of size is greater
for larger transactions: the total benefit of regulation increases at an increasing
rate as the size of the transaction increases. If this view is correct, the
relationship between the total benefit of regulation and the size of the
transaction would look something like the graph in Figure 6. 103
A small business exemption is efficient under this view as well. As with
the Pierce model, the total cost and total benefit curves must intersect at some
positive transaction size, as shown in Figure 7. Ignoring transaction costs,
101

102

Pierce, supra note 66, at 551.
See RALPH NADER, ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 15-32 (1976) (blaming

a number of social ills, including industrial pollution, health problems, racial discrimination,
invasions of privacy, and unsafe products, on big businesses); Mark Green, The Corporation
and the Community, in CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA 42, 42-64 (Ralph Nader & Mark J.
Green eds., 1973) (arguing that big corporations reduce civic welfare, pollute more, engage
in less philanthropy, and engage in more racial discrimination). See generally DAVID C.
KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE THE WORLD 3 (2d ed. 2001) (arguing that large
corporations are responsible for many of the world's problems).
103 As with the Pierce view, any number of functions would be consistent with the
populist view. A simple equation that fits this view is Total Benefit = pSize)2, where fJ is a
constant. Assuming a linear cost model, transactions should be exempted up to the size
where FC + a(Size) = pSizel
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transactions smaller than that size should be exempted, because for those
smaller transactions, the total cost of regulation exceeds the total benefit.
2. Nonlinear costs
The relationship between the size of a transaction and the total cost of a
regulation may also be nonlinear due to declining marginal cost over some
range of size. In addition to economies of scale related to fixed costs, there are
sometimes economies of scale related to variable costS.104 The more frequently
a regulated entity encounters a particular regulation, the smaller the cost per
unit of output to comply with the regulation. Figure 8 shows a cost curve
consistent with this possibility. As with nonlinear benefit curves, assuming that
the cost curve is nonlinear does not affect the basic conclusion: a small
transaction exemption of some size is still efficient. Assumptions of
nonlinearity may affect the size of the transaction that it is efficient to exempt,
but they do not affect the argument for some small business exemption.
D. A Further Complication: Economies ofScale, But No Fixed Costs

The previous discussion assumed that regulation involves at least some
fixed costs, costs that do not vary with the size of the regulated transaction or
firm. But what if a regulation involves no fixed costs, only variable costs? In
that situation, no definite conclusion is possible. The efficiency of a small
business exemption depends on the structure of the cost and benefit curves for
the particular regulation.
Figure 9 illustrates this point. Curve B is a hypothetical benefit curve for a
particular regulation; the benefits of regulation are directly proportional to the
size of the transaction. Curves C l and C z are two possible cost curves, each of
which involves economies of scale in variable costS.I05 For curve CI, the total
benefit of regulation always exceeds the total cost, no matter how small the
transaction. The regulation always produces a net benefit, so a small business
exemption would be inefficient. For curve C z, the total cost of regulation
exceeds the total benefit to the point where curve C z intersects with the benefit
curve B. A small business exemption for transactions smaller than the size at
that point could be efficient: for such smaller transactions, the cost of
regulation exceeds the benefit.
Thus, if a regulation involves no fixed costs, no categorical conclusions
can be reached concerning the efficiency of small business exemptions.
However, regulation almost invariably involves fixed costs, so this
theoretically possible but empirically doubtful state of affairs is of little
concern.
E.

Tiering Regulation: Eliminating the Dualistic Choice

So far, I have assumed a simple, dualistic choice between full application
of a regulation to a particular firm or a complete exemption. That assumption is

104
105

See supra text accompanying notes 58-61.
Neither includes any fixed costs.

2004]

DOES SIZE MATTER?

21

unrealistic. Different levels of regulation can be applied to different sizes of
regulated firms-a graduated system of tiering that increases the amount of
regulation as the size of the firm increases. I06 Consider, for example,
hypothetical regulations requiring special accommodations for disabled persons
in new buildings. Assume that the regulations require all new buildings to
include easily accessible elevators, Braille signs, and flashing lights for alarms.
Assume further that elevators are the most expensive requirement, flashing
lights less expensive, and Braille signs the least expensive. Large buildings
could be required to include all three accommodations, medium-sized buildings
only the signs and flashing lights, and very small buildings only the signs. As
another example, consider environmental laws restricting emissions. Most
factories could be required to reduce their emissions of carbon monoxide to 2
parts per million (ppm), but the standard could be relaxed for smaller factories
to, for example, 5 ppm. Various intermediate levels of regulation short of total
exemption are possible for most governrnent regulations.
Obviously, the costs and benefits of tiered regulation differ from the costs
and benefits of "full" regulation. In the disabilities example, it costs less if
elevators are not required, but the total benefit is also less. In the air pollution
example, it costs less to reduce emissions if the standard is less restrictive, but
the health benefits could be less as well. Since the costs and benefits are
different for intermediate tiers of regulation, the net benefit of intermediate
regulation will usually not be the same as the net benefit of full regulation.
Tiering, in effect, creates a variable exemption depending on the size of
the regulated firms. But the possibility of tiering does not significantly affect
the argument for a complete exemption from regulation at some size level.
Each tier of regulation has cost and benefit functions of its own, and the costs
are both fixed and variable. Whether the pollution emission standard is 2 ppm
or 5 ppm, the factory must invest in equipment to control emissions, the cost of
which does not entirely depend on the output of the factory. And the benefit of
the regulation, at whatever level, is still a function of the size of the transaction.
The argument for a small business exemption from the lowest tier of
regulation is the same as that already made. The basic cost-benefit model still
applies, with the same conclusion: For any possible tier of regulation, there is a
size below which the regulation is inefficient because it produces a negative net
benefit. Tiered regulation may make regulation of some smaller transactions
efficient, and thus lower the size cutoff for a full exemption, but there still is
some size below which transactions should be totally exempted from
regulation.
F.

Another Complication: Reorganization or Disso!ution

l07

The compliance cost of regulation used to compare costs and benefits
should be the cheapest means for a regulated firm to comply with the
106 See generally UNITED STATES REGULATORY COUNCIL, supra note 10 (discussing the
concept of regulatory tiering).
107 My thanks to my late colleague Norm Thorson for raising the issue discussed in this
section.
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regulation. If two equally effective technologies are available to meet the
regulatory standard and one is cheaper than the other, the cost of the cheaper
technology should be used in cost-benefit calculations. If a business has a
choice between spending $1 million or $500,000 to comply with a regulation, it
is neither fair nor honest to say that compliance costs $1 million.
This obvious point has less obvious consequences, because the basic idea
extends beyond technological choices in a way that advocates of small business
exemptions almost never consider. Some of the possible responses to
regulation involve organizational structure: a regulated firm may dissolve,
reorganize or expand its business in reaction to a regulatory requirement. 108 If
the cost of dissolution or reorganization (including, in the case of dissolution,
the lost value of the firm's foregone production) is less than the cost of
compliance, and that cost is less than the benefit of applying the regulation to
the firm, dissolution, or reorganization is the efficient solution.
A small business exemption is not justified merely because regulation will
put small firms out of business. If the total benefit of regulating a firm exceeds
the total compliance cost (and all other regulatory costs), an exemption is not
efficient, even if the firm cannot incur the compliance cost and remain
competitive. Since the total benefit of regulating the firm exceeds the total cost,
the firm should not be exempted. Regulatory economics does not support the
survival of small businesses if continuing to operate those businesses produces
an economic loss.
The more complicated case is where the cost to the firm of complying with
the regulation, when added to other regulatory costs, exceeds the total benefit
of the regulation. The total cost of the regulation appears to exceed its total
benefit, justifYing an exemption. But recall that the "cost" in the cost-benefit
formula must be the firm's cheapest reaction to the regulation. The firm's cost
to comply with the regulatory requirements is not necessarily the firm's least
expensive response to the regulation; going out of business might be less costly
than compliance. If so, the relevant cost to the firm is not the compliance cost,
but the cost to dissolve the firm. If the total cost of the regulation, including the
cost of dissolution, is less than the total benefit, the firm should not be
exempted. It should be regulated and forced out of business. 109 If, on the other
hand, the total cost of the regulation (including the cost of dissolution as the
firm's cost, if that is cheaper than compliance) exceeds the total benefit, the
firm should be exempted. The important question is not whether the firm will
survive, but the relationship between the total cost and the total benefit of the
regulation.

108 The discussion in this section relates only to exemptions based on the size of the
regulated firm, not to exemptions based on the size of the regulated transaction.
109 Brock and Evans argue that tiering "preserves inefficient small businesses whose
operation decreases social welfare." William A. Brock & David S. Evans, The Economics of
Regulatory Tiering, 16 RAND J. ECON. 398, 406 (1985). This model accounts for that cost.
See also Becker & Henderson, supra note 98, at 415 (finding that air quality regulation
promotes the "growth of small, relatively dirty (unregulated) plants" and kept otherwise
unprofitable grandfathered plants in business).
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Compliance with the regulation and dissolution of the firm are not a firm's
only possible responses to regulation. The regulated firm may also expand or
reorganize. For example, assume there are five identical small firms and the
cost for each firm to comply with a particular regulation is 100. 110 If the benefit
of applying the regulation to each firm is only 90, an exemption for these firms
would seem to be justified. The cost, 100, exceeds the benefit, 90. But assume
further that the total benefit of regulating a firm five times as large is 450, but
due to economies of scale, the total compliance cost for a firm five times as
large is only 350. If it would cost less than 100 to combine all five firms into a
single, larger firm, III the small firms should not be exempted from the
regulation. The least expensive method of responding to the regulation is a
reorganization that produces a single, large firm. If, for example, the cost of
reorganization is 50, the total cost of the regulation is 400 (350 + 50) compared
to a benefit of 450. Application of the regulation to these firms produces a net
benefit compared to the no-regulation baseline. IIZ
V. THE MEASUREMENT OF SIZE
If small businesses are to be granted regulatory exemptions, how should
size be measured? As discussed supra,113 existing small business exemptions
do not use a single, consistent measure of size. Should exemptions be based on
the size of the transaction, the size of the firm engaged in the transaction, or
both? And, in either case, how should we measure the size of the transaction or
the size of the firm?
The answer, facetious as it may seem, is that exemptions should be based
on any measure of size that supports an exemption. Exemptions are efficient if
they increase the net benefit of a regulation by eliminating applications of the
regulation that result in a net loss. If the regulator can carve out a class of cases
where regulation produces a net loss, it should do so, no matter how that class
of cases is described. Just as a sculptor carves away everything that does not

110 To keep the example simple without affecting its validity, assume that this is the
only cost of the regulation and ignore other regulatory costs such as enforcement and rulemaking costs.
III This cost must, of course, include all bargaining costs and other transaction costs. It
must also include any market costs related to loss of competition and potential competition.
112 A study of OSHA standards for lead exposure in construction provides a possible
illustration of this point. Generally, the study found no economies of scale-most
compliance costs were "proportional to the number of workers, worker-days, or crews."
MICROECONOMIC ApPLICATIONS, INC., supra note 62, at 81. Economies of scale were found
in two construction industries, but as the study's authors pointed out:
it is somewhat striking that the two construction industries where per-employee costs
are four or five times as high for small businesses as for large ones-floor laying and
structural steel-are also the industries where average employment size for small
establishments is very substantially below the efficient crew size assumed in the
analysis.
Id.
1I3 See supra text accompanying notes 10- I4.
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look like his subject, I 14 the regulator must carve away everything that does not
produce a net benefit.
The relevant dimension of size will usually be one along which the
benefits of regulation increase, and that will vary from regulation to regulation.
In the case of a minimum wage law, the appropriate measure of size is
undoubtedly total employee work hours. The greater the number of employee
hours, the greater the collective benefit to those employees of the minimum
wage. In the case of securities registration requirements, the appropriate
dimension is the dollar amount of the offering. The larger the offering, the
greater the collective investment, and the greater the benefit of the disclosure
IIS
required by the Securities ACt. In the case of the regulation of pollution, the
appropriate dimension is the amount of pollutants discharged. The greater the
amount of pollution, the greater the benefit of preventing the discharge.
If it is difficult to measure the relevant dimension of size directly, a proxy
may be efficient. For example, we may want to exempt from environmental
regulation firms that discharge less than a certain amount of pollutants each
year. If the amount of pollutants discharged by each firm is not easy to measure
directly, we might instead choose a proxy that we can measure more easily. If
the amount of pollutants discharged is strongly correlated with manufacturing
output, and manufacturing output in tum is strongly correlated with sales, an
exemption based on the amount of a firm's sales could be less costly to apply
and exempt essentially the same firms.
The benefits of a particular regulation may vary along multiple dimensions
of size. For example, for certain antitrust restrictions, the total benefit varies
both with the size of the relevant market and with the size of the firms in that
market. Regulating price-fixing by two firms that control 50 percent of a $10
billion market will produce greater benefits, ceteris paribus, than regulating
price-fixing by two firms that control 50 percent of a $10,000 market.
Regulating price-fixing by two firms that account for $9.5 billion of the sales in
a $10 billion market will produce greater total benefits, ceteris paribus, than
regulating price-fixing by two firms that only account for $100,000 ofthe sales
in the same $10 billion market.
Where benefits vary significantly along multiple dimensions, a variety of
size-based exemptions are available. Two separate exemptions might be
efficient. For example, in the price-fixing example, one could exempt all pricefixing in any market with less than $10,000 in sales and also exempt pricefixing in any market, no matter how large, by firms collectively controlling less
than five percent of the market. A single exemption that combines the two
dimensions of size is another possibility. Price-fixing by firms with less than
five percent of the sales in a market with total sales of less than $50,000 could

114 Vern Countryman once offered the following instructions for sculpting an elephant:
"Obtain a large piece of stone. Take hammer and chisel and knock off everything that
doesn't look like an elephant." Vern 'Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part
1.,57 MINN. L. REv. 439,460 n.85 (1973).
115 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z-3 (2003).
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be exempted. 116 The goal is to choose the exemption or combination of
exemptions that maximizes the net benefit of the regulation.
VI. THE TRANSACTION COSTS OF SMALL TRANSACTION EXEMPTIONS

If the total cost of applying a regulation to small firms or small
transactions exceeds the total benefit, those firms or transactions should be
exempted from the regulation in the absence of any transaction costs
associated with the exemption. Thus, absent transaction costs, size-based
exemptions can be efficient. But exemptions do have transaction costs, and
those transaction costs complicate the analysis, making it less likely that any
particular small business exemption is efficient.
I have written elsewhere about the transaction costs of regulatory
exemptions; 117 I will not repeat that discussion here. But, some of those
transaction costs are relatively obvious.- It is more costly for a regulator to
create a regulation with exemptions, particularly with well-tailored exemptions
that minimize error costs, than it is to create a regulation that applies across the
board. Enforcement costs are also higher with exemptions because of the
existence of firms not required to comply with the regulation; the regulator
must police not only the regulation, but also the exemption. Exemptions also
increase the information costs of regulated firms, which must determine
whether or not they are exempt, and exemptions sometimes increase the
information costs of unregulated third parties who may need to distinguish
between regulated and unregulated firms. Exemptions also encourage wasteful
strategic behavior by firms seeking to avoid regulation. I IS
These transaction costs must be considered in deciding whether small
business exemptions are efficient. The original proposition, not considering
transaction costs, was to exempt transactions if the total cost of regulation for
those transactions exceeded the total benefit (TC > TB). In Figure 10, all
transactions falling to the left of the vertical line would be exempted. The net
gain resulting from exempting a particular class of firms is the amount by
which the total cost of regulating firms of that size exceeds the total benefit (TC
-TB).
Introducing transaction costs only slightly complicates this basic model. It
is efficient to exempt smaller transactions or firms only if the gain from doing
so (TC - TB) exceeds the transaction costs of the exemption. In other words, an
exemption is efficient if (TC -TB) > Transaction Costs, or, to put the equation
in a form that is easier to illustrate graphically, only if TC > (TB + Transaction
Costs). Figure 11 illustrates this point. The size at which an exemption is

116 This example is used only as an illustration. It may be that no price-fixing should be
exempted.
1I7 See C. Steven Bradford, The Cost of Regulatory Exemptions (Nov. 14, 2003)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Journal of Small & Emerging Business Law).
liS Brock and Evans argue, for example, that small business exemptions encourage
larger businesses to become inefficiently small solely to utilize the exemptions. See Brock &
Evans, supra note 109, at 406. The argument is actually more complicated than that, see
Bradford, supra note 117, but their basic point is valid.

26

THE JOURNAL OF SMALL & EMERGING BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 8:1

justified has shifted to the left. Once the transaction costs of an exemption are
taken into account, the size below which it is efficient to exempt firms or
transactions decreases. Fewer firms will be exempted and more will be
regulated. If the transaction costs of an exemption are high relative to the costs
and benefits of a particular regulation, it is possible that no size-based
exemption is efficient-all firms should be regulated. Figure 12 illustrates that
possibility. In Figure 12, the total cost of the regulation never exceeds the sum
of the total benefit and the transaction costs of an exemption. It is not efficient
to exempt any firms, no matter how small.
VII. DOES THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF REGULATION MATTER?
Politicians and others often complain about the cumulative effect of
government regulation on small businesses-the accumulation of costs
resulting from the application of many different types of regulation. I 19 As one
analyst argues,
The problem is not so much with any specific regulation as it is with the
overall phenomenon.... The cumulative impact of regulatory efforts is
to depress economic activity, retard job creation, and stifle the
entrepreneurial spirit. When regulations are issued with little regard for
their marginal impact when added to existing requirements, their results
can be particularly oppressive. Regulations are like straws that eventually
break the camel's back. 120
If the cost of applying any particular regulation or regulatory scheme to
small businesses exceeds the benefit (and that difference exceeds an
exemption's transaction costs), small businesses should be exempted. Does it
add anything to that basic conclusion to consider the cumulative impact of
many different regulations? The answer is yes, but the analysis is more
complicated than those complaining about the cumulative burden of regulation
realize. Considering the cumulative effect of regulation could justify less
regulation of small business, but it also could justify more.

119 See, e.g., Peter M. Berkery, Jr., The Impact of Government Regulations on Small
Business, NAT'L PUB. ACCT., June 1992, at 14 (noting that, although the majority of
government regulations serve valid purposes in isolation, "the cumulative burden of federal
regulations can quickly overwhelm small business owners."); Harrison, supra note 17, at
191 (noting that "relatively minor competitive impacts from a single regulation may cascade
into major changes when all regulatory initiatives are taken into account.").
For an attempt to consider the cost impact of all types of government regulation on small
businesses, see ROLAND J. COLE & PHILIP D. TEGELER, GOVERNMENT REQUIREMENTS OF
SMALL BUSINESS (1980). Jonathan Adler provides an interesting case study of the cumulative
impact of regulation on the dry-cleaning industry. See Jonathan H. Adler, Taken to the
Cleaners: A Case Study of the Overregulation of American Small Business, Cato Policy
Analysis No. 200 (Dec. 22, 1993), at http://www.cato.orglpubs/pas/pa-200.html.
120 Adler, supra note 119, at 30.
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The Transaction Cost Argument

Considering regulations cumulatively affects the transaction costs
associated with small business exemptions. Transaction costs may justify a
global small business exemption from all regulation even though some
individual regulations produce a net benefit when applied to smaller
transactions. The converse is also true: transaction costs may justify the global
application of all regulations to small businesses even though the application of
some individual regulations produces a net loss.
Assume, for example, that there are only ten government regulatory
programs, R 1 through RIO. The individual application of regulations R 1 through
R 9 to small businesses-for example, those with ten or fewer employeesresults in a net loss. But the application of regulation RIO to those same small
businesses results in a small net benefit. Considering each of those regulations
on a non-cumulative, individual basis, cost-benefit analysis tells us that this
class of small businesses should be exempted from regulations R 1 through R9,
but not from regulation RIO.
Once transaction costs are taken into account, the efficient result is less
clear. A global exemption from all the regulations, R 1 through RIO, would
reduce rule-making and enforcement costs, as well as information costs to
small firms, which would not have to determine which regulations apply and
which do not. If the transaction cost savings associated with a global exemption
exceed the benefit foregone by not applying regulation RIO, a global exemption
is efficient. A single small business exemption should cover all regulation,
even if the application of some regulation individually produces a net
benefit. 121
The opposite situation is also possible. Assume that the individual
application of regulations R 1 through R 9 to small businesses results in a net
benefit and the application of regulation RIO results in a net loss. The savings in
transaction costs from not having any exemptions may exceed the individual
loss from the application of regulation RIO to small businesses. If so, there
should be no exemption, even from regulation RIO. 122
B.

The Cumulative Costs and Benefits ofRegulation

Considering regulation on a cumulative basis also affects the costs and
benefits of regulation, independent of any effect on the transaction costs of
exemptions. However, the policy prescription arising from this cumulative
effect is ambiguous, contrary to statements by those supporting small business

121 One problem is determining the business size cutoff for a global exemption from
regulation. Different measures of size may be appropriate for different types of regulation,
and the point at which costs exceed benefits will vary from one regulation to another.
Crafting a global exemption would, therefore, be very difficult and would involve
transaction costs of its own, but the goal is, as always, to maximize the net benefit of all the
regulation.
122 This, of course, is merely a specific application of the general point made earlier: an
exemption from a particular regulation is inefficient if its transaction costs exceed the net
loss produced by application of the regulation.
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exemptions. Consideration of the cumulative costs and benefits of all
regulation may justify less regulation of small businesses, but it could also
justify more regulation of small businesses. However, if the costs and benefits
of each individual regulation are calculated on a marginal basis, as they should
be, this cumulation problem (but not the transaction cost issue) disappears.
Both the cumulative costs of all regulation and the cumulative benefits of
all regulation are less than the sums of the costs and benefits of each individual
regulation. Since there is no theoretical reason to expect the reduction in costs,
when considered cumulatively to be proportionate to the reduction in benefits,
a paradox is possible, although unlikely. The cumulative benefit of all
regulation (for a particular size of firm) could exceed the cumulative cost, even
though the cost of each individual regulation exceeds its benefit. Conversely,
the cumulative cost of all regulation for a particular size of firm could exceed
the cumulative benefit, even though the benefit of each individual regulation
exceeds its cost.
The cost component of this potential paradox is due to economies of
scope. 123 Different regulations require similar tasks and there are economies
when all of those tasks can be performed by the same people at the same time.
For example, one of the costs of the Americans with Disabilities Act 124 is
training a firm's hiring personnel, who must learn what hiring ~ractices are
disallowed by the Act. The Equal Employment Opportunity Ad 5 imposes a
similar cost, but with respect to women and minorities rather than the disabled.
To the extent that personnel training for the two statutes can be combined, the
overall training cost may be less than what it would cost to train people under
each statute separately. Paperwork and labeling requirements may involve
similar economies.
A similar effect occurs with respect to the benefits of regulation. Two
related regulations aimed at the same problem might not produce cumulatively
the sum of the benefits each regulation would produce individually. For
example, assume that Regulation A requires plants to use cleaner fuel to reduce
air pollution. The total benefit of Regulation A, by itself, is x. Regulation B
requires plants to install scrubbers on their smokestacks. The total benefit of
Regulation B, by itself, is y. The cumulative benefit of the two regulations
together should be less than x + y. Cleaner fuel will provide fewer benefits if
the company already has scrubbers, and scrubbers will provide fewer benefits if
the company already uses cleaner fuel.
This cumulative effect on benefits is not necessarily limited to closely
related regulations. For example, consider the possible interaction between toy
safety regulation and securities law disclosure requirements. If securities law
requires toy manufacturers to disclose potential liability and toy safety issues,

123 The costs of individual regulations sometimes interact with each other in ways that
should not affect cumulative costs. For example, the cost to install smokestack scrubbers
may be greater if the firm has to pay a mandated minimum wage than if it does not, but that
interaction does not affect the cumulative costs of those regulations. The cumulative cost of
the two regulations is merely the sum of the cost of each regulation.
124 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2003).
125 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2003).

2004]

DOES SIZE MATTER?

29

the public relations impact of that disclosure may cause manufacturers to
produce safer toys. If manufacturers produce safer toys because of the public
relations impact of securities law disclosure, a regulation directly imposing toy
safety requirements will produce fewer benefits then it would in the absence of
securities law disclosure.
The problem of cumulating costs and benefits disappears, however, if
those costs and benefits are measured accurately in the first place. The costs
and benefits of any regulation should be measured on a marginal basis: given
that Regulation A already exists, what are the additional costs and benefits of
adding Regulation B? If that has been done properly in evaluating the
regulations individually, any interaction among regulations should have been
taken into account in the individual cost-benefit calculations and there is no
cumulative effect. The cumulative costs and benefits of all regulation would be
the sum of the individual marginal costs and benefits of each regulation.
VIII. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REGULATORY COSTS AND OTHER
ECONOMIES OF SCALE
Uniform application of regulatory requirements, without small business
exemptions, gives a competitive advantage to larger firms, which have a lower
per-unit compliance cost due to economies of scale. 126 This increases the size
of firm that can survive,127 and drives smaller, marginal firms out of
business. 128 In addition, the increased costs to small firms resulting from
economies of scale will raise barriers to entry and eliminate the potential
competition on which we rely so heavily to keep prices in line. 129

126 MCGARITY, supra note 7, at 115. See also James L. Huffman, The Impact of
Regulation on Small and Emerging Businesses, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 307 (2000)
(hypothesizing that increased regulation in the twentieth century significantly disadvantaged
small businesses relative to big, established businesses); Impact of Federal Regulation on
Small Business, supra note 45, at 3 (Statement of Rep. Andy Ireland). See also Bruce D.
Phillips, The Effect of Industry Deregulation on the Small Business Sector, 20 Bus. ECON.
28, 28 (1985) (concluding that small firms dominated the creation of new businesses and
new jobs when industries were deregulated).
127 Robert A. Leone, The Real Costs ofRegulation, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1977,
at 57; Impact ofFederal Regulation on Small Business, supra note 45, at 123 (statement of
Dr. Milton Kafoglis).
128 ROBERT A. LEONE & JOHN E. JACKSON, The Political Economy of Federal
Regulatory Activity: The Case of Water-Pollution Controls, in STUDIES IN PUBLIC
REGULATION 239 (Gary Fromm, ed., 1981). See also Neumann & Nelson, supra note 70, at
196 (finding that small mines' share of total output fell from 1.16% to 1.01% after passage
of the Act); Linneman, supra note 70, at 476 (finding that smaller firms' sales and net
income decreased after adoption of the 1973 mattress flammability standard).
129 Russell W. Pittman, Issues in Pollution Control: Interplant Cost Differences and
Economies of Scale, 57 LAND ECON. 1, 13 (1981); Robert A. Leone, supra note 127, at 62;
Impact of Federal Regulation on Small Business, supra note 45, at 125 (statement of Dr.
Milton Kafoglis). Dean and Brown, for instance, found a significant negative correlation
between new firm entries into an industry and the industry's capital expenditures for
pollution abatement, a proxy for the amount of pollution regulation of the industry. Thomas
J. Dean & Robert L. Brown, Pollution Regulation as a Barrier to New Firm Entry: Initial
Evidence and Implications for Future Research, 38 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 288,297 (1995). See
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The differential impact of regulation on businesses of different sizes can,
at least in theory, give larger businesses an incentive to support costly
regulation. 130 Government regulation increases the costs of all regulated firms,
but it can also drive marginal, smaller firms out of the industry and discourage
new entrants, reducing supply and increasing the market price of the industry's
product. 131 The increased profits resulting from the price increase could
possibly exceed the increased regulatory cost for the surviving firms,
increasing their profits. 132 However, the limited evidence on this point is
mixed. 133
Viewing regulatory economies of scale as a competitive advantage to big
businesses does, however, raise an interesting issue. Big businesses have many
other advantages over small businesses resulting from economies of scale.
Machinery, production processes, distribution, and numerous other business
activities cost less per unit on a larger scale. Economists do not usually argue
that the government should protect small businesses from the negative effects
of these other economies of scale. Doing so would encourage businesses to be
inefficiently small. So why should regulatory economies of scale be treated any
differently from these "natural" economies of scale? If small businesses cannot
efficiently comply with the cost of government regulation, as with any other
cost of business, they can either grow to an efficient size or be driven out of
business.

also Booz-ALLEN & HAMILTON, Inc., supra note 70, at 34-41 (finding, subsequent to EPA
regulations, increases in industry concentration, decreases in small firms' shares of total
sales, and fewer new entrants).
\30 See Michael T. Maloney & Robert E. McCormick, A Positive Theory of
Environmental Quality Regulation, 25 J.L. & ECON. 99, 105 (1982). Moreover, this
differential impact would affect the type of regulation different sizes of business would
support. One would expect large businesses to favor regulations with higher fixed costs and
lower variable costs and small businesses to favor regulations with lower fixed costs and
higher variable costs. BROCK & EVANS, supra note 26, at 70.
\3\ See Lacy Glenn Thomas, Regulation and Firm Size: FDA Impacts on Innovation, 21
RAND J. ECON. 497,498-99 (1990); Maloney & McCormick, supra note 130, at 105.
132 See generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) (discussing the political economy of regulation and how
industry can use government regulation to further its own purposes); Scott Barrett,
Environmental Regulation for Competitive Advantage, Bus. STRATEGY REv. Spr. 1991, at I
(discussing the competitive effects of environmental regulation).
\33 Compare John S. Hughes et aI., The Economic Consequences of the OSHA Cotton
Dust Standards: An Analysis ofStock Price Behavior, 29 J.L. & ECON. 29, 57 (1986) (noting
that the evidence does not support "the conclusion that the cotton dust standards permitted
large firms to gain in profitability at the expense of smaller cotton producers."); Thomas,
supra note 13 I, at 513 (concluding that, at least in the 1960s, large firms actually benefited
from FDA regulation because of reduced competition from smaller firms); Ann P. Bartel &
Lacy Glenn Thomas, Predation Through Regulation: The Wage and Profit Effects of the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency,
30 J.L. & ECON. 239, 257 (1987) (concluding that OSHA and EPA regulations benefited
large firms in the Frost Belt at the expense of small firms in the Sun Belt); Richard S.
Higgins & Fred S. McChesney, supra note 70, at 207-08 (finding a significant positive
increase in the market value of the top advertising firms associated with the FTC's ad
substantiation regulations).
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The key to answering that question is to look at things from the standpoint
of the regulator rather than the regulated firm. We want the regulator, like any
other economic actor, to make choices that produce the greatest net benefit. If
adopting a regulation with a small business exemption produces a greater net
benefit than adopting the same regulation without a small business exemption,
the regulation with the exemption is preferable. If not, the regulation without
the exemption is preferable.
The effect of an exemption on the ability of small businesses to compete is
secondary. Small business exemptions are not economically efficient, because
they lower the costs of small businesses or protect them from competition.
Small business exemptions are economically efficient only because, and if,
they increase the net benefit of regulation.
IX. CONCLUSION
Small business exemptions can be economically efficient, even if a
regulation applied globally produces a net benefit. They are a way of tailoring
regulation to maximize its net benefit-by exempting those firms or
transactions whose regulation results in a net loss. And, due to regulatory
economies of scale, the costs of regulation will invariably exceed the benefits
for some size of businesses. The fact that small business exemptions may be
efficient does not mean, however, that they are always efficient. Exemptions
have their own costs. Once those transaction costs are considered, the
efficiency of small business exemptions depends very much on the particular
regulation. The transaction costs of a small business exemption may outweigh
the gains the exemption creates by freeing small firms from netloss regulation.
In short, small business exemptions are neither the panacea their
proponents claim nor the political plum described by their opponents. Some
small business exemptions may be efficient but some may not be.
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FIGURE 1
The Relationship Between the Size of the Transaction and
the Total Cost of Regulation
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FIGURE 3
The Costs and Benefits of Regulation
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FIGURES
Costs and Non-Linear Benefits: Pierce View
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FIGURE 6
Non-Linear Benefits: Nader View
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FIGURE 7
Costs and Non-Linear Benefits: Nader
View
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FIGURE 9
No Fixed Costs; Linear Benefits
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FIGURE 10
The Costs and Benefits of Regulation
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FIGURE 11

The Costs and Benefits of Regulation
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